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11-6431

Christian Herle MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Travel Restrictions on U.S. Service Attaches to the USSA

The United States Intelligence Board has taken cognisance of a recent Soviet threat to limit U.S. Service Attacks travel. Secause the Board members regard the intelligence yield from that travel as particularly important they have approved the artached resolution and asked that I forward it to you.

SIGNED

ALLEN W. DULLES Chairman

Attachment

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I - Mr. Kuhrtz (FBI).

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RESOLUTION OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Travel Restrictions on the U.S. Service Attaches to the USSR

I. It has been brought to the attention of the U.S. Intelligence Board that the Soviet Government has informed the U.S. Army Attache, Moscow, that U.S. Attache travel in the USSR may be put on a			
reciprocal trip for	trip basis.		
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effectively to block U.S. Attache travel by merely ceasing to travel themselves.

On the other hand, there are many other features of reciprocity in this matter in which the belance is in the other direction. Because of the freedom of travel, as well as freedom of the press, privileges and courtesies accorded by this Government, the Soviet personnel in the U.S. have had extensive access to intelligence. whereas U.S. personnel in the USSR have been subjected to severe barassment and mistreatment with continual restriction on their travels, even in the Soviet declared "open" areas. In this connection, we note that, while U.S. Attaches have engaged in relatively more travel, no Soviet Attache requests for travel in the U.S. have been turned down, although some Soviet Attache requests have been approved only if modified. On the other hand, the USSR has rejected ever 25% of the U.S. Attache travel requests. It is recognized that additional restrictive Soviet action, including the institution of trip for trip reciprocity, may call for firm reciprocal action. In our view, the Soviets at a high level, and in a way indicated by the prevailing political situation, might be firmly apprised of the treatment accorded U.S. personnel within the USSR; and that unless their adverse practices are discontinued, the U.S. will be obliged to impose compensatory restrictive measures.

3. Any limitations on travel by U.S. Embassy personnel are detrimental to the U.S. intelligence collection effort, and action by the U.S. which may lead to such restrictions should, we believe, be taken only when the U.S. can expect a clear net offsetting gain, or as necessary to maintain a U.S. position or safeguard U.S. security.